People For the American Way - IN SUPPORT OF HR 811

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We expect Rep. Holt's H.R. 811 -- the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act -- to come to a vote within the next 2 weeks. The bill, which would drastically improve standards for voting machines before the 2008 election, is a major priority for PFAW and PFAW Foundation's Democracy Campaign and for fair elections advocates across the country. We're teaming up with our allies at Common Cause, MoveOn.org, Working Assets, The Brennan Center for Jusitce, VoteTrustUSA and others for a national call-in.

FAQs

Q: It seems like there’s some discord in the voter advocacy community—PFAW, Common Cause, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Vote Trust USA, and election technology experts like Avi Rubin and Ed Felten support the bill, and others, like Black Box Voting or Brad Friedman of BradBlog have been critical of you for doing so. Can you explain your differences?

A: Well, in this case, there are a lot more areas of agreement than disagreement. Everyone agrees that the status quo is unacceptable—that in 2008 we can’t have another Sarasota-like election where 18,000 ballots just disappear. We agree that there’s a need for election reform at the federal level. We agree that paperless voting has got to end—there has to be a paper trail that must be used for recounts and audits. (By paper trail we mean paper record. There is disagreement over what forms of paper records to allow. Groups like PFAW, Common Cause, MoveOn, etc. would allow paper ballots counted by hand or by optical scan machines and voter verified paper ballots from DREs. Others like Black Box Voting and Brad Friedman of BradBlog oppose the use of DRE machines even if they produce a voter verified paper ballot.)

The basic principle is the same—every American citizen should be able to exercise his or her right to vote—and that right shouldn’t be taken away because a machine fails. That’s what we’re all fighting for in the best way we know how. And it’s PFAW’s and others’ judgment that the Holt bill is a strong first step in that direction. Now there are some areas of disagreement within our community about specific policy questions—for example, whether electronic voting machines, or “DREs,”should be banned completely—and these specific areas of disagreement are discussed below.

The key point is that men and women of good will are going to disagree on some of the provisions of this bill—that’s true of every piece of legislation. But we think and hope that we all agree that we must take action. The status quo is unacceptable.

Q: Why are you supporting the Holt Bill?

A: We’ve had substantial election problems in the U.S. in recent years, and voting machines have been a big part of the problem. In Sarasota, Florida, last year, more than 18,000 votes disappeared on electronic machines that didn’t produce a paper trail. And Sarasota was hardly the only place with problems. So the status quo is unacceptable. Unverifiable, unauditable elections simply don’t work, and it’s time for change. The Holt Bill is a big step forward in correcting these problems, while ensuring that voting is accessible to all, including those voters with disabilities or language needs. The bill makes many improvements to the status quo: verifiable paper ballots, mandatory audits, requiring that source code can be examined, etc.

Q: But doesn’t the Holt Bill legalize DREs?

A: DREs are already legal, including those paperless DREs that are unauditable. The Holt Bill requires all electronic voting systems to provide a paper trail that voters can verify before they leave the polling place, and requires mandatory audits, comparing the paper record to the computer tallies. If there is any discrepancy between the paper and electronic tallies, the paper record is the official ballot to be counted. Only those DREs that provide such auditability and verifiability are permitted under this bill.

Q: Why does PFAW support the use of DREs

A: PFAW/F supports voting systems that are verifiable and auditable, as well as accessible to all voters. Such systems may include DREs with verifiable audit trails, paper ballots read by optical scan tabulators, or ballot marking devices. While DREs with audit trails may not be the right technology for every jurisdiction, they can provide some voters, particularly those with disabilities and language needs, with enhanced access. Other civil rights groups, in their expertise, have time and again stated that electronic voting enhances access to the ballot for voters with disabilities and language needs. Jurisdictions with large numbers of such voters—particularly those with diverse communities with different needs, or multiple minority languages—should have the flexibility to utilize the best technology that will serve their voters, while also maintaining standards of integrity. There is no need to compromise access for eligible voters in order to improve integrity. Technology as it presently exists, and as it is being developed for the near future, is consistent with both ideals.

Q: But aren’t optical scan machines just as good for voters with language needs?

A: Most civil rights groups view electronic voting technology as the best option for voters with language needs, particularly in jurisdictions which must provide translations in multiple minority languages pursuant to the Voting Rights Act, since it puts complete control of the translations in the hands of the voter. The translation is preloaded onto the electronic voting machine, and the voter can decide whether to access it, taking such decisions out of the hands of poll workers who are often poorly-trained. Translated paper ballots (of the sort used with optical scan machines) require that the jurisdiction identify exactly how many translated ballots in each language should be distributed to each polling place, that poll workers are trained to distribute them, and that they WILL distribute them (even if they disagree with the policy of translated ballots). Furthermore, it requires voters to admit that they are not fully proficient in English, which many are loathe to do. In ours, and other civil rights groups’ experiences, having monitored thousands of precincts nationwide, this is a substantial burden on minority language voters, and not one study indicates otherwise. WE DON’T ADVOCATE THE USE OF DREs NATIONWIDE, HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE JURISDICTIONS SHOULD HAVE THE FLEXIBILITY TO USE SUCH TECHNOLOGY IF THEY DETERMINE THAT IT BEST SERVES THEIR VOTERS, SO LONG AS THE MACHINES ARE FULLY VERIFIABLE AND AUDITABLE.

Q: What if amendments banning DREs are offered on this bill?

A: We will not oppose the offering of any amendments to this bill, though we may urge Members to vote against particular amendments to the bill if those amendments weaken the bill, impose unreasonable burdens on voters, or greatly lessen the likelihood of its passage. Many disability rights and civil rights advocates believe that the accessibility touch-screen machines offer is critical and they would oppose a ban on such machines. Such opposition could scuttle hopes for passage of the Holt bill and other legislation.

Q: Isn’t this bill a huge unfunded mandate?

A: This bill currently authorizes 300 million dollars to help jurisdictions comply. Many jurisdictions, particularly those that currently use optical scan equipment (which is roughly half the electorate), will require very little money to comply. However, it may require more money to comply with the important mandates of this bill, and therefore, we are working closely with Congress to make sure that however much money it costs to ensure our elections have integrity, the federal government picks up the tab to ensure fair elections, as it should.

Q: Won’t the provision requiring that the verification be converted into accessible media for disabled voters require the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars?

A: No. There are many pieces of technology currently used by jurisdictions that are fully or partially compliant (such as the AutoMARK device), and even those jurisdictions that do not have such devices, can purchase several different types of technologies, including some off-the-shelf, that will comport with this requirement. While some have claimed the purchase of this equipment will cost a total of one billion dollars, compliant off-the-shelf equipment is available for far less, perhaps costing as little as forty million dollars nationwide. Most importantly, though, disabled voters, like all voters, should have just as much right to truly verify their ballots as anyone else. Any bill that requires that voters be able to verify their ballots MUST afford disabled and blind voters that same opportunity.

Q: Doesn’t the Holt Bill make the EAC a permanent fixture?

A: No. The EAC was created by HAVA (the Help America Vote Act), and that Act did not make the EAC temporary. The Holt Bill does not change the status of the EAC at all, except to LIMIT its discretion by establishing explicit statutory standards that it, and all jurisdictions, MUST follow.

Q: Does the Holt Bill eliminate secret ballots for military voters?

A: No. It further protects those ballots, by expressly requiring that any system put in place for military and overseas voters “preserve the privacy of the voter.”

Q: Are the audit protocols in the bill sufficient?

A: Those audit protocols were the result of the work of a coalition of advocates, experts and computer scientists, including the Brennan Center, the Center for Election Integrity, and experts at UC Berkeley, Stanford, and Cornell. In their opinion, the audit protocols in the Holt Bill provide for a high degree of confidence, while also taking into account practicalities of election administration. As with the entire bill, these protocols establish the MINIMUM standards—any state could require more rigorous protocols if that’s what its citizens demand.

Q: Why doesn’t the bill require that ANY citizen have the ability to demand a FULL audit?

A: Allowing any citizen to demand a full audit would be unworkable—it could clog the system and cause more problems than it would solve. Computer experts have reviewed the audit protocols, and determined that they will work well. Citizens also do have a private right of action under this bill to demand that election technology complies with the requirements of the bill. However, it is not our intention to see the machinery of elections be ground to a halt. The goal is to make sure that such machinery accurately reflects the will of the voters, and the current audit protocols are a good way of doing that, while also taking into account the practicalities of running elections.

Q: Does the Holt Bill allow a loophole for some states to conduct electronic recounts of the computer records, rather than recounts using the paper ballots or paper trails?

A: Absolutely not. The bill is explicit that ONLY voter verified paper ballots may be used in any and all recounts, as well as audits. Even if the paper ballots have been compromised, through printer jams, or any other event, the paper ballots are STILL the ballot of record for recounts, unless anyone seeking to use the electronic tally can prove by CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE (a higher standard than that usually required in civil litigation) that a sufficient number of the paper ballots have been so compromised that the result of the election would be changed.

Q: Who are the Holt bill’s supporters?

A: The Holt bill has attracted broad and growing support from voter advocates, civil rights, and progressive organizations. In addition to People For the American Way and People For the American Way Foundation, supporters include SEIU and the NEA, Avi Rubin and Ed Felten, Common Cause, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Brennan Center, the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Vote Trust USA, MoveOn, and others.